PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE REMUNERATION POLICY
FOR THE EXECUTIVE BOARD AS ADOPTED AT THE 2011 AGM

Executive Board and Supervisory Board remuneration policy 2020 Proposed changes for approval at 2020 AGM (changes in red)

The remuneration policy reflects our longstanding remuneration principles of supporting the business strategy, paying for performance, and paying competitively and fairly. The remuneration policy and underlying principles support our long-term sustainable business growth in the widely diverse markets in which we operate.

Part I – Executive Board remuneration policy

Remuneration principles

The Executive Board remuneration policy is designed to meet four key principles:

Support the business strategy
We align our remuneration policy with business strategies focused on creating long-term sustainable growth and shareholder value, while maintaining a tight focus on short-term financial results.

Pay for performance
We set clear and measurable targets for our short-term and long-term incentive policies, and we pay higher remuneration when targets are exceeded and lower remuneration when targets are not met.

Pay competitively
We set target remuneration to be competitive with other relevant multinational corporations of similar size and complexity.

Pay fairly
We set target remuneration to be internally consistent and fair; we regularly review internal pay relativities between the Executive Board and the wider employee population and aim to achieve consistency and alignment in, amongst others, remuneration changes, salary structures and the design of variable compensation where possible.

While establishing and implementing the remuneration policy, the perspective and input of internal and external stakeholders are taken into consideration, as is the public opinion. HEINEKEN is also committed to an ongoing dialogue with shareholders and seeks the views of main shareholders before any material changes to remuneration arrangements are put forward for approval.

PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE REMUNERATION POLICY FOR THE EXECUTIVE BOARD AS ADOPTED AT THE 2011 AGM

Summary overview of remuneration elements

The Executive Board remuneration policy is simple and transparent in design, and consists of the following key elements:

Remuneration element	Description	Strategic role
Base salary	Involves fixed cash compensation Aims for the median of the labour market peer group	Facilitates attraction and is the basis for competitive pay Rewards performance of day-to-day activities
Short-term incentive	Is based on achievements of annual measures, of which a weighted 75% relate to financial and operational measures for Heineken N.V. and 25% to individual leadership measures Aims, at target level, for the median of the labour market peer group Is partly paid in cash, and partly in investment shares with a holding period of five calendar years: – the part paid in shares is between 25% and 50% of the full before-tax Short-term incentive amount, depending on the individual's choice whether, and to which extent, to exceed the mandatory 25% share investment – the part in cash is paid net of taxes (i.e. after deduction of withholding tax due on the full before-tax Short-term incentive amount) Investment shares are matched on a 1:1 basis after the holding period	Drives and rewards annual HEINEKEN performance Drives and rewards sound business decisions for the long-term health of HEINEKEN Aligns Executive Board and shareholder interests
Long-term incentive	Is based on achievements of three-year financial targets for Heineken N.V. Aims, at target level, for the median of the labour market peer group Is awarded through the vesting of shares, net of taxes (i.e. after deduction of withholding tax due on the full before-taxLong-term incentive amount) Vested shares are blocked for another two years, to arrive at a five-year holding restriction after the date of the conditional performance grant	Drives and rewards sound business decisions for the long-term health of HEINEKEN Aligns Executive Board and shareholder interests Supports Executive Board retention
Pensions	Defined Contribution Pension Plan and/or Capital Creation Plan	Provides for employee welfare and retirement needs
Benefits	Provides a range of benefits, including, but not limited to, company car, fuel and health insurance Aims to be in line with local market practice	Provides market competitive benefits to aid retention

PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE REMUNERATION POLICY FOR THE EXECUTIVE BOARD AS ADOPTED AT THE 2011 AGM

Labour market peer group

A global labour market peer group was adopted by the AGM in 2011, and subsequently adjusted in 2012 and 2017. The median target remuneration of this peer group is a reference point for the target remuneration of the CEO and CFO. Each year, the Remuneration Committee validates the peer group to ensure relevance, and recommends adjustments to the Supervisory Board if needed. For 2020 (and 2019), the peer group consisted of the following companies:

Anheuser-Busch InBev (BE)
Carlsberg (DK)
Coca-Cola (US)
Colgate-Palmolive (US)
Danone (FR)
Diageo (UK)
Henkel (DE)
Kimberley-Clark (US)
Mondelēz International (US)
L'Oréal (FR)
Nestlé (CH)
Pepsico (US)
Pernod Ricard (FR)
Unilever (NL)

Base salary

Every year, peer group and base salary levels are reviewed, and the Remuneration Committee may propose adjustments to the Supervisory Board. HEINEKEN aims to compensate at median on target remuneration of the peer group. However, when changes in base salary are considered, broader factors are taken into account, including but not limited to the individual and business performance and the internal pay relativities.

Short-term incentive

The Short-term incentive (STI) is designed to drive and reward the achievements of HEINEKEN's annual performance targets. Through its payout in both cash and investment shares it also drives and rewards sound business decisions for HEINEKEN's long-term health while aligning Executive Board and shareholder interests at the same time. The target STI opportunities for 2020 are 140% of base salary for the CEO and 100% of base salary for the CFO. These percentage opportunities are well aligned with the labour market peer group medians.

The STI opportunities are for a weighted 75% based on financial and operational measures for Heineken N.V., and for a weighted 25% on individual leadership measures. At the beginning of each year, the Supervisory Board establishes the performance measures, their relative weights and corresponding targets based on HEINEKEN's business priorities for that year. The Supervisory Board ensures that a balanced mix of financial, operational and individual performance measures is selected, which incentivises executives to achieve our annual business strategy and the growth of shareholder value. The financial and operational measures and their relative weights are reported in the Remuneration Report upfront; the numerical performance targets themselves are not disclosed as they are considered to be commercially sensitive. In the first weeks of the following year, the Supervisory Board reviews the Company and individual performance against the pre-set targets, and approves the STI payout levels based on the performance achieved. The performance on each of the measures is reported in qualitative terms in the Remuneration Report after the end of the performance period. The STI payout for 2020 is subject to four performance measures: Organic Net Revenue Growth (weight: 35%), Organic Net Profit beia Growth (weight: 15%), Free Operating Cash Flow (weight: 25%) and Individual Leadership measures (weight: 25%).

For each performance measure, a threshold, target and maximum performance level is set with the following STI payout, as a percentage of target payout:

Threshold performance
50% of target payout

Target performance
100% of target payout

Maximum performance
200% of target payout.

For each measure, payout in between these performance levels is on a straight-line basis; below threshold performance the payout is zero, whereas beyond maximum performance it is capped at 200% of payout at target.

In line with policy, 25% of the STI payout is paid out in shares, referred to as investment shares. At their discretion, the Executive Board members have the opportunity to indicate before the end of the performance year whether they wish to receive up to another 25% of their STI payout in additional investment shares. All investment shares thus received are then blocked and cannot be sold under any circumstance, including resignation, for five calendar years to link the value of the investment shares to long-term Company performance. Withholding tax on the investment shares and on the cash part of the STI payout is settled with the cash part at the time of payout. After the blocking period is completed after five calendar years, the Company will match the investment

shares 1:1 in the first weeks of the following year, i.e. one matching share is granted for each investment share. As from then, there are no holding requirements on these investment shares anymore, and there are no holding requirements on the resulting matching shares that remain after withholding tax on these shares. According to plan rules, matching entitlements will be forfeited in case of dismissal by the Company for an urgent reason within the meaning of the law ('dringende reden'), or in case of dismissal for cause ('gegronde reden') whereby the cause for dismissal concerns unsatisfactory functioning of the Executive Board member. With this 'deferral-and-matching' proposition a significant share ownership by the Executive Board is ensured, creating an increased alignment with the interests of shareholders. The Supervisory Board has the power to revise the amount of the STI payout to an appropriate amount if the STI payout that would have been payable in accordance with the agreed payment schedule would be unacceptable according to standards of reasonableness and fairness. The Supervisory Board is entitled to claw back all or part of the STI payout (in cash, investment shares or matching shares) insofar as it has been made on the basis of incorrect information about achieving the performance conditions.

Long-term incentive

The Long-term incentive (LTI) is designed to drive and reward sound business decisions for HEINEKEN's long-term health, and to align the Executive Board with shareholder interests by linking rewards to HEINEKEN's share price performance. The target LTI opportunities for 2020 are 150% of base salary for the CEO and 125% of base salary for the CFO.

Each year, a target number of performance shares is conditionally granted based on the aforementioned target LTI opportunity percentage of that year, the base salary of that year, and the closing share price of 31 December of the preceding year. The vesting of these performance shares is contingent on HEINEKEN's performance over a period of three years on four fundamental financial performance measures:

Organic Net Revenue Growth
To drive top line growth

Organic Operating Profit beia Growth
To drive profitability and operational efficiency

Earnings Per Share (EPS) beia Growth
To drive overall long-term Company performance

Free Operating Cash Flow
To drive focus on cash.

These four performance measures have equal weights to minimise the risk that participants over-emphasise one performance measure to the detriment of others. At the beginning of each performance period, the Supervisory Board establishes the corresponding numerical targets for these performance measures based on HEINEKEN's business priorities. These targets are not disclosed upfront as they are considered to be commercially sensitive. In the first weeks after the end of the performance period, the Supervisory Board reviews the Company's performance against the pre-set targets, and approves the LTI vesting based on the performance achieved. The performance on each of the measures is reported in qualitative terms in the Remuneration Report after the performance period has been completed (cf. Part II).

For each performance measure, a threshold, target and maximum performance level is set with the following performance share vesting schedule:

Threshold performance
50% of performance shares vests

Target performance
100% of performance shares vests

Maximum performance
200% of performance shares vests.
For each measure, vesting in between these performance levels is on a straight-line basis; below threshold performance the vesting is zero, whereas beyond maximum performance it is capped at 200% of vesting at target.


The Supervisory Board has the power to revise the amount of performance shares that will vest to an appropriate number if the number of performance shares that would have vested under the agreed vesting schedule would be unacceptable according to standards of reasonableness and fairness. The Supervisory Board is entitled to claw back all or part of the shares transferred to the Executive Board members upon vesting (or the value thereof) insofar as vesting occurred on the basis of incorrect information about achieving the performance conditions. The vested performance shares that remain after withholding tax are subject to an additional holding restriction of two years, to arrive at a five-year holding restriction after the date of the conditional performance grant.

PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE REMUNERATION POLICY FOR THE EXECUTIVE BOARD AS ADOPTED AT THE 2011 AGM

Pay mix

The mix between fixed pay and variable pay for various levels of performance is illustrated below. In these charts, fixed pay refers to base salary only, excluding pensions and other emoluments, and variable pay consists of the aforementioned Short-term and Long-term incentive opportunities, including the 'deferral-and-matching' proposition. Share price movements during performance and holding periods are hereby not included since these are unknown in the context of target remuneration.

[Changed table]



Pensions

The members of the Executive Board participate in a defined-contribution Capital Creation Plan. As of 2015, following pension reforms in the Netherlands, new members of the Executive Board receive the same contribution as new executives under Dutch employment contract below the Executive Board, which is currently 18% of base salary. This applies to our current CFO who became an Executive Board member in 2015. For the CEO the same capital creation arrangement as for 2014 remained in force, since the existing executives below the Executive Board at that time were compensated on an individual basis for part of the impact of the aforementioned pension reforms. The contribution to the CEO therefore remains an age-dependent percentage of base salary and STI payout. Both Executive Board members have chosen to receive their full pension contributions as taxable income, as opposed to applying tax deferral to the maximum amount possible.

Benefits

The members of the Executive Board are eligible to receive benefits in line with HEINEKEN's most senior employees. The benefits include, but are not limited to, company car, fuel and health insurance. Other benefits could be offered in circumstances where this allows executives to successfully fulfil the responsibilities of their role. For example in case of a relocation the appropriate relocation support is provided. The levels of the benefits will be competitive in the relevant local market and could be changed year on year.

Loans

HEINEKEN does not provide loans to the members of the Executive Board.

Term of appointment

New members of the Executive Board are appointed by the AGM for the duration of 4 years, subject to reappointment by the AGM.

Notice period

The service agreement may either be terminated by the member of the Executive Board or by the Company. The notice period will not be more than 12 months for both the Company and the individual.

PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE REMUNERATION POLICY FOR THE EXECUTIVE BOARD AS ADOPTED AT THE 2011 AGM

Compensation rights on termination of employment/service agreement

If the Company gives notice of termination of the employment agreement of Mr. Van Boxmeer for a reason which is not an urgent reason ('dringende reden') within the meaning of the law, the Company shall pay severance compensation to Mr. Van Boxmeer on expiry of his employment agreement. This severance compensation shall be set on the basis of the notion of reasonableness taking into account all the circumstances of the matter, including whether Mr. Van Boxmeer shall be bound by a non-competition obligation and whether any allowance is paid by the Company in relation to this non-competition obligation. In case of dismissal for cause ('ontslag met gegronde reden') whereby the cause for dismissal concerns unsatisfactory functioning of Mr. Van Boxmeer, the severance compensation cannot exceed one year's base salary.

If the Company gives notice of termination of the service agreement of Mrs. Debroux for a reason which is not an urgent reason ('dringende reden') within the meaning of the law, or decides not to extend the service agreement upon its expiry, or if the AGM does not re-appoint Mrs. Debroux as member of the Executive Board for a subsequent term, the Company shall pay Mrs. Debroux an amount equal to one year of base salary.
The treatment of incentive awards will depend on the circumstances of departure. A proposal will be made by the Remuneration Committee to be pursued by the Supervisory Board. In case of dismissal by the Company for an urgent reason within the meaning of the law ('dringende reden'), or in case of dismissal for cause ('gegronde reden') whereby the cause for dismissal concerns unsatisfactory functioning of the Executive Board member, the unvested incentive awards will be forfeited.

Derogation clause

The Supervisory Board upon recommendation of the Remuneration Committee may temporarily deviate from any sections of the Policy based on its discretion in the circumstances described below:

- Upon change of the Executive Board member in accordance with the new hire policy,
- In any other circumstance where the deviation may be required to serve the long-term interests and sustainability of the Company as a whole or to assure its viability.

New hire policy

Our recruitment policy is to offer a compensation package that allows HEINEKEN to attract, retain and motivate the individual with the right skills for the required role. When determining remuneration for an Executive Board member, the Supervisory Board will, at the recommendation of the Remuneration Committee, consider the role's requirements, business needs, the individual's skills and experience and the relevant external talent market.

Where an individual is recruited externally for an Executive Board member position, the remuneration package in their prior role will be taken into account. The Supervisory Board will seek to align the new member's remuneration package with the Executive Board Remuneration Policy. The Company may offer compensation to buy out awards or other lost compensation which the candidate held prior to joining HEINEKEN, but which lapsed upon leaving their previous employer. The rationale of any such award will be disclosed in the Remuneration Report.

Where an individual is appointed to the Executive Board through internal promotion or following a corporate transaction (e.g. an acquisition), the Board retains the ability to honour any legally binding legacy arrangements agreed prior to the appointment.

Remuneration Governance

The Remuneration Committee makes the proposal to the Supervisory Board for the Remuneration Policy to be pursued, and makes a proposal for the remuneration of the individual members of the Executive Board for adoption by the Supervisory Board. In accordance with Dutch Law, the remuneration policy will be submitted for approval to the AGM at least every four years, or in case of material amendments to the policy. The Executive Board members shall not participate in the decision making regarding their own remuneration to avoid conflict of interest.

Part II –Supervisory Board remuneration policy

Remuneration principles

The Supervisory Board remuneration policy is designed to attract and retain high-class and diverse profiles with relevant skills and experience that are required to perform the Supervisory Board's duties and ensures appropriate corporate governance by meeting the following key principles:

- Support the business strategy

We align our remuneration policy with business strategies focused on creating long-term sustainable growth and shareholder value

- Pay for purpose

We align our remuneration policy to promote the independence and objectivity of our Supervisory Board members, which is a key element to best serve the long-term interest of the company

- Pay competitively

We set remuneration levels to be competitive with other relevant multinational corporations of similar size and complexity

While establishing and implementing the policy, the perspective and input of internal and external stakeholders and the external environment in which HEINEKEN operates, are taken into consideration. HEINEKEN is also committed to an ongoing dialogue with shareholders and seeks the views of significant shareholders before any material changes to remuneration arrangements are put forward for approval.

Summary overview of remuneration elements

The Supervisory Board remuneration policy is simple and transparent in design, and consists of the following key elements:

Element	Purpose	Description
Base Board Fees	▪ Supervisory Board members receive a fixed cash compensation for their services. ▪ In line with the Dutch Corporate Governance code, no variable pay and / or equity awards are offered. ▪ In order to provide a fee level that is competitive with other companies comparable to HEINEKEN, reviews are conducted on a regular basis.	▪ The Remuneration Committee is responsible to review the compensation levels on a regular basis and to bring forward proposals (if any) to the Supervisory Board. Proposals are submitted to the Annual General Meeting for approval. ▪ This review is done through a benchmark assessment against a pan-European peer group consisting of companies that are of comparable size to HEINEKEN.
Committee Fees	▪ Supervisory Board members are compensated for additional responsibilities such as Committee membership. ▪ In order to provide a fee level that is competitive with other companies comparable to HEINEKEN, reviews are conducted on a regular basis.	▪ Members are eligible to receive additional fees in respect of serving as a Chairman or Member of a Committee. ▪ Fee levels between Committees can differ if this is deemed appropriate dependent on the time commitment and responsibilities associated with the Committee membership. ▪ Fees are additive; if a Board member serves in multiple Committees, the compensation will consist of the Board membership fee and the sum of the corresponding Committee fees.
Allowances and Benefits	▪ Supervisory Board members are reimbursed and compensated for additional efforts that enable them to exercise their role.	▪ Members receive reimbursement of travel expenses and are compensated for intercontinental travel required to exercise their role. ▪ Small benefits such as retirement gifts may also be provided.

Detailed information on individual actual remuneration will be provided in the remuneration report as well as in the 2020 Financial Statements.

Executive Board and Supervisory Board remuneration policy

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Part I – Executive Board remuneration policy

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Pay competitively
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Long-term incentive	Is based on achievements of three-year financial targets for Heineken N.V Aims, at target level, for the median of the labour market peer group Is awarded through the vesting of shares, net of taxes (i.e. after deduction of withholding tax due on the full before-taxLong-term incentive amount) Vested shares are blocked for another two years, to arrive at a five-year holding restriction after the date of the conditional performance grant	Drives and rewards sound business decisions for the long-term health of HEINEKEN Aligns Executive Board and shareholder interests Supports Executive Board retention
Pensions	Defined Contribution Pension Plan and/or Capital Creation Plan	Provides for employee welfare and retirement needs
Benefits	Provides a range of benefits, including, but not limited to, company car, fuel and health insurance Aims to be in line with local market practice	Provides market competitive benefits to aid retention

Labour market peer group

A global labour market peer group was adopted by the AGM in 2011, and subsequently adjusted in 2012 and 2017. The median target remuneration of this peer group is a reference point for the target remuneration of the CEO and CFO. Each year, the Remuneration Committee validates the peer group to ensure relevance, and recommends adjustments to the Supervisory Board if needed. For 2020 (and 2019), the peer group consisted of the following companies:

Anheuser-Busch InBev (BE)	Diageo (UK)	Nestlé (CH)
Carlsberg (DK)	Henkel (DE)	Pepsico (US)
Coca-Cola (US)	Kimberley-Clark (US)	Pernod Ricard (FR)
Colgate-Palmolive (US)	Mondelēz International (US)	Unilever (NL)
Danone (FR)	L'Oréal (FR)	

Base salary

Every year, peer group and base salary levels are reviewed, and the Remuneration Committee may propose adjustments to the Supervisory Board. HEINEKEN aims to compensate at median on target remuneration of the peer group. However, when changes in base salary are considered, broader factors are taken into account, including but not limited to the individual and business performance and the internal pay relativities.

Short-term incentive

The Short-term incentive (STI) is designed to drive and reward the achievements of HEINEKEN's annual performance targets. Through its payout in both cash and investment shares it also drives and rewards sound business decisions for HEINEKEN's long-term health while aligning Executive Board and shareholder interests at the same time. The target STI opportunities for 2020 are 140% of base salary for the CEO and 100% of base salary for the CFO. These percentage opportunities are well aligned with the labour market peer group medians.

The STI opportunities are for a weighted 75% based on financial and operational measures for Heineken N.V., and for a weighted 25% on individual leadership measures. At the beginning of each year, the Supervisory Board establishes the performance measures, their relative weights and corresponding targets based on HEINEKEN's business priorities for that year. The Supervisory Board ensures that a balanced mix of financial, operational and individual performance measures is selected, which incentivises executives to achieve our annual business strategy and the growth of shareholder value. The financial and operational measures and their relative weights are reported in the Remuneration Report upfront; the numerical performance targets themselves are not disclosed as they are considered to be commercially sensitive. In the first weeks of the following year, the Supervisory Board reviews the Company and individual performance against the pre-set targets, and approves the STI payout levels based on the performance achieved. The performance on each of the measures is reported in qualitative terms in the Remuneration Report after the end of the performance period. The STI payout for 2020 is subject to four performance measures: Organic Net Revenue Growth (weight: 35%), Organic Net Profit beia Growth (weight: 15%), Free Operating Cash Flow (weight: 25%) and Individual Leadership measures (weight: 25%).

For each performance measure, a threshold, target and maximum performance level is set with the following STI payout, as a percentage of target payout:

Threshold performance

50% of target payout

Target performance

100% of target payout

Maximum performance

200% of target payout.

For each measure, payout in between these performance levels is on a straight-line basis; below threshold performance the payout is zero, whereas beyond maximum performance it is capped at 200% of payout at target.

In line with policy, 25% of the STI payout is paid out in shares, referred to as investment shares. At their discretion, the Executive Board members have the opportunity to indicate before the end of the performance year whether they wish to receive up to another 25% of their STI payout in additional investment shares. All investment shares thus received are then blocked and cannot be sold under any circumstance, including resignation, for five calendar years to link the value of the investment shares to long-term Company performance. Withholding tax on the investment shares and on the cash part of the STI payout is settled with the cash part at the time of payout. After the blocking period is completed after five calendar years, the Company will match the investment

shares 1:1 in the first weeks of the following year, i.e. one matching share is granted for each investment share. As from then, there are no holding requirements on these investment shares anymore, and there are no holding requirements on the resulting matching shares that remain after withholding tax on these shares. According to plan rules, matching entitlements will be forfeited in case of dismissal by the Company for an urgent reason within the meaning of the law ('dringende reden'), or in case of dismissal for cause ('gegronde reden') whereby the cause for dismissal concerns unsatisfactory functioning of the Executive Board member. With this 'deferral-and-matching' proposition a significant share ownership by the Executive Board is ensured, creating an increased alignment with the interests of shareholders. The Supervisory Board has the power to revise the amount of the STI payout to an appropriate amount if the STI payout that would have been payable in accordance with the agreed payment schedule would be unacceptable according to standards of reasonableness and fairness. The Supervisory Board is entitled to claw back all or part of the STI payout (in cash, investment shares or matching shares) insofar as it has been made on the basis of incorrect information about achieving the performance conditions.

Long-term incentive

The Long-term incentive (LTI) is designed to drive and reward sound business decisions for HEINEKEN's long-term health, and to align the Executive Board with shareholder interests by linking rewards to HEINEKEN's share price performance. The target LTI opportunities for 2020 are 150% of base salary for the CEO and 125% of base salary for the CFO.

Each year, a target number of performance shares is conditionally granted based on the aforementioned target LTI opportunity percentage of that year, the base salary of that year, and the closing share price of 31 December of the preceding year. The vesting of these performance shares is contingent on HEINEKEN's performance over a period of three years on four fundamental financial performance measures:

Organic Net Revenue Growth
To drive top line growth

Organic Operating Profit beia Growth
To drive profitability and operational efficiency

Earnings Per Share (EPS) beia Growth
To drive overall long-term Company performance

Free Operating Cash Flow
To drive focus on cash.

These four performance measures have equal weights to minimise the risk that participants over-emphasise one performance measure to the detriment of others. At the beginning of each performance period, the Supervisory Board establishes the corresponding numerical targets for these performance measures based on HEINEKEN's business priorities. These targets are not disclosed upfront as they are considered to be commercially sensitive. In the first weeks after the end of the performance period, the Supervisory Board reviews the Company's performance against the pre-set targets, and approves the LTI vesting based on the performance achieved. The performance on each of the measures is reported in qualitative terms in the Remuneration Report after the performance period has been completed (cf. Part II).

For each performance measure, a threshold, target and maximum performance level is set with the following performance share vesting schedule:

Threshold performance
50% of performance shares vests


Target performance
100% of performance shares vests

Maximum performance
200% of performance shares vests.
For each measure, vesting in between these performance levels is on a straight-line basis; below threshold performance the vesting is zero, whereas beyond maximum performance it is capped at 200% of vesting at target.

The Supervisory Board has the power to revise the amount of performance shares that will vest to an appropriate number if the number of performance shares that would have vested under the agreed vesting schedule would be unacceptable according to standards of reasonableness and fairness. The Supervisory Board is entitled to claw back all or part of the shares transferred to the Executive Board members upon vesting (or the value thereof) insofar as vesting occurred on the basis of incorrect information about achieving the performance conditions. The vested performance shares that remain after withholding tax are subject to an additional holding restriction of two years, to arrive at a five-year holding restriction after the date of the conditional performance grant.

Pay mix

The mix between fixed pay and variable pay for various levels of performance is illustrated below. In these charts, fixed pay refers to base salary only, excluding pensions and other emoluments, and variable pay consists of the aforementioned Short-term and Long-term incentive opportunities, including the 'deferral-and-matching' proposition. Share price movements during performance and holding periods are hereby not included since these are unknown in the context of target remuneration.



Pensions

The members of the Executive Board participate in a defined-contribution Capital Creation Plan. As of 2015, following pension reforms in the Netherlands, new members of the Executive Board receive the same contribution as new executives under Dutch employment contract below the Executive Board, which is currently 18% of base salary. This applies to our current CFO who became an Executive Board member in 2015. For the CEO the same capital creation arrangement as for 2014 remained in force, since the existing executives below the Executive Board at that time were compensated on an individual basis for part of the impact of the aforementioned pension reforms. The contribution to the CEO therefore remains an age-dependent percentage of base salary and STI payout. Both Executive Board members have chosen to receive their full pension contributions as taxable income, as opposed to applying tax deferral to the maximum amount possible.

Benefits

The members of the Executive Board are eligible to receive benefits in line with HEINEKEN's most senior employees. The benefits include, but are not limited to, company car, fuel and health insurance. Other benefits could be offered in circumstances where this allows executives to successfully fulfil the responsibilities of their role. For example in case of a relocation the appropriate relocation support is provided. The levels of the benefits will be competitive in the relevant local market and could be changed year on year.

Loans

HEINEKEN does not provide loans to the members of the Executive Board.

Term of appointment

New members of the Executive Board are appointed by the AGM for the duration of 4 years, subject to reappointment by the AGM.

Notice period

The service agreement may either be terminated by the member of the Executive Board or by the Company. The notice period will not be more than 12 months for both the Company and the individual.

Compensation rights on termination of employment/service agreement

If the Company gives notice of termination of the employment agreement of Mr. Van Boxmeer for a reason which is not an urgent reason ('dringende reden') within the meaning of the law, the Company shall pay severance compensation to Mr. Van Boxmeer on expiry of his employment agreement. This severance compensation shall be set on the basis of the notion of reasonableness taking into account all the circumstances of the matter, including whether Mr. Van Boxmeer shall be bound by a non-competition obligation and whether any allowance is paid by the Company in relation to this non-competition obligation. In case of dismissal for cause ('ontslag met gegronde reden') whereby the cause for dismissal concerns unsatisfactory functioning of Mr. Van Boxmeer, the severance compensation cannot exceed one year's base salary.

If the Company gives notice of termination of the service agreement of Mrs. Debroux for a reason which is not an urgent reason ('dringende reden') within the meaning of the law, or decides not to extend the service agreement upon its expiry, or if the AGM does not re-appoint Mrs. Debroux as member of the Executive Board for a subsequent term, the Company shall pay Mrs. Debroux an amount equal to one year of base salary.
The treatment of incentive awards will depend on the circumstances of departure. A proposal will be made by the Remuneration Committee to be pursued by the Supervisory Board. In case of dismissal by the Company for an urgent reason within the meaning of the law ('dringende reden'), or in case of dismissal for cause ('gegronde reden') whereby the cause for dismissal concerns unsatisfactory functioning of the Executive Board member, the unvested incentive awards will be forfeited.

Derogation clause

The Supervisory Board upon recommendation of the Remuneration Committee may temporarily deviate from any sections of the Policy based on its discretion in the circumstances described below:

- Upon change of the Executive Board member in accordance with the new hire policy,
- In any other circumstance where the deviation may be required to serve the long-term interests and sustainability of the Company as a whole or to assure its viability.

New hire policy

Our recruitment policy is to offer a compensation package that allows HEINEKEN to attract, retain and motivate the individual with the right skills for the required role. When determining remuneration for an Executive Board member, the Supervisory Board will, at the recommendation of the Remuneration Committee, consider the role's requirements, business needs, the individual's skills and experience and the relevant external talent market.

Where an individual is recruited externally for an Executive Board member position, the remuneration package in their prior role will be taken into account. The Supervisory Board will seek to align the new member's remuneration package with the Executive Board Remuneration Policy. The Company may offer compensation to buy out awards or other lost compensation which the candidate held prior to joining HEINEKEN, but which lapsed upon leaving their previous employer. The rationale of any such award will be disclosed in the Remuneration Report.

Where an individual is appointed to the Executive Board through internal promotion or following a corporate transaction (e.g. an acquisition), the Board retains the ability to honour any legally binding legacy arrangements agreed prior to the appointment.

Remuneration Governance

The Remuneration Committee makes the proposal to the Supervisory Board for the Remuneration Policy to be pursued, and makes a proposal for the remuneration of the individual members of the Executive Board for adoption by the Supervisory Board. In accordance with Dutch Law, the remuneration policy will be submitted for approval to the AGM at least every four years, or in case of material amendments to the policy. The Executive Board members shall not participate in the decision making regarding their own remuneration to avoid conflict of interest.

Part II –Supervisory Board remuneration policy

Remuneration principles

The Supervisory Board remuneration policy is designed to attract and retain high-class and diverse profiles with relevant skills and experience that are required to perform the Supervisory Board's duties and ensures appropriate corporate governance by meeting the following key principles:

- **Support the business strategy**

We align our remuneration policy with business strategies focused on creating long-term sustainable growth and shareholder value

- **Pay for purpose**

We align our remuneration policy to promote the independence and objectivity of our Supervisory Board members, which is a key element to best serve the long-term interest of the company

- **Pay competitively**

We set remuneration levels to be competitive with other relevant multinational corporations of similar size and complexity

While establishing and implementing the policy, the perspective and input of internal and external stakeholders and the external environment in which HEINEKEN operates, are taken into consideration. HEINEKEN is also committed to an ongoing dialogue with shareholders and seeks the views of significant shareholders before any material changes to remuneration arrangements are put forward for approval.

Summary overview of remuneration elements

The Supervisory Board remuneration policy is simple and transparent in design, and consists of the following key elements:

Element	Purpose	Description
Base Board Fees	▪ Supervisory Board members receive a fixed cash compensation for their services. ▪ In line with the Dutch Corporate Governance code, no variable pay and / or equity awards are offered. ▪ In order to provide a fee level that is competitive with other companies comparable to HEINEKEN, reviews are conducted on a regular basis.	▪ The Remuneration Committee is responsible to review the compensation levels on a regular basis and to bring forward proposals (if any) to the Supervisory Board. Proposals are submitted to the Annual General Meeting for approval. ▪ This review is done through a benchmark assessment against a pan-European peer group consisting of companies that are of comparable size to HEINEKEN.
Committee Fees	▪ Supervisory Board members are compensated for additional responsibilities such as Committee membership. ▪ In order to provide a fee level that is competitive with other companies comparable to HEINEKEN, reviews are conducted on a regular basis.	▪ Members are eligible to receive additional fees in respect of serving as a Chairman or Member of a Committee. ▪ Fee levels between Committees can differ if this is deemed appropriate dependent on the time commitment and responsibilities associated with the Committee membership. ▪ Fees are additive; if a Board member serves in multiple Committees, the compensation will consist of the Board membership fee and the sum of the corresponding Committee fees.
Allowances and Benefits	▪ Supervisory Board members are reimbursed and compensated for additional efforts that enable them to exercise their role.	▪ Members receive reimbursement of travel expenses and are compensated for intercontinental travel required to exercise their role. ▪ Small benefits such as retirement gifts may also be provided.

Current Supervisory Board Management fees were approved by the 2019 AGM. Detailed information on individual actual remuneration is provided in the annual report.